The management of a service parts supply chain is especially challenging in environments characterized by low-demand rates, expensive parts and high service requirements. As a result, an increasing number of manufacturers have begun pursuing a strategy that promotes inventory sharing among the dealers in their distribution network. Hence, there is a need for decision models that enable the analysis of the dealer inventory sharing problem, particularly in decentralized dealer networks, i.e., networks in which the dealers are independent of the manufacturer. In this paper we develop a framework for modeling and analyzing inventory sharing problems in decentralized dealer networks. We first analyze an individual dealer problem under inventory sharing in a make-to-stock setting. We use dynamic programming to characterize the structure of the optimal policy for an individual dealer. A queueing approach is then used to characterize the performance measures for this optimal inventory replenishment and sharing policy. We then consider a decentralized, multi-dealer setting to study the impact of inventory sharing among independent dealers. A game theoretic approach is used to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the system.
Introduction
In recent years, distribution strategies have drawn increased attention from manufacturing firms as they seek to succeed in a competitive market. As engineering excellence and manufacturing efficiency become more common, the importance of "after sales service" and time-based competition has driven firms to place more emphasis on their distribution network and logistics management. This is especially true in industries for which response and repair times are critical, or for which the equipment is large, expensive, and essential. These include the earth moving equipment industry, the machine tool industry, the automotive industry, the semi-conductor industry, etc.
Concurrent with these developments is a heightened awareness of the needs of the end-customer -a movement towards the provision of "customer centric" supply chain solutions has taken place.
The management of logistics in a service parts supply chain to provide customer centric solutions is especially challenging. For example, our interaction with the heavy machine industry suggests that this industry has the following unique features:
• Most of the products in this industry are capital-intensive equipment. These products provide critical services to the customers' business, thus requiring an extremely high service level and prompt service to minimize machine downtime.
• There are a large number of part types in service. For example, some companies service over one-half million separate parts, most stocked in their distribution facilities.
• These service parts are characterized by extremely low demand rates. For example, a fast moving part may imply a demand of 300 units per year all over the world.
• There are two classes of demands: emergency and regular. Emergency orders are the result of machine failure at the customer and must be expedited from the manufacturer when there is a stock out. Regular orders are used for replenishment of a customer's own stock and can be backlogged when there is a stock out.
These unique characteristics of service-parts systems have created great challenges in developing parts' distribution and inventory control strategies for heavy equipment manufacturers.
A typical service-parts logistics system can be characterized by a complex multi-echelon network which consists of several large distribution centers, a number of regional distribution centers and numerous independent dealerships. The manufacturer usually provides exclusive rights to the dealers and each dealer markets to a geographical region that is specified in their contractual agreement. The manufacturer chooses to have independent dealers serving exclusive regions in order to best motivate the dealers to serve the customers. Since the dealers are closer to the customers and meet the customers' direct needs on a daily basis, the performance of the dealers directly influences customer satisfaction and, in the long-run, the manufacturer's sales and profits.
The importance of successfully managing such a dealer network is highlighted by the following quote from Donald V. Fites, ex-Chairman and CEO of Caterpillar. "We think we are better engineers and manufacturers than our competitors, but we are convinced that our single greatest advantage over our competition is our system of distribution and product support. The backbone of that system is our 186 independent dealers around the world who sell and service our products" (Fites, 1996) . Thus, manufacturers understand the importance of the partnership between their dealers and themselves, and strive to best help the dealers in providing after sales service. As a result, many manufacturers take the initiative for developing programs beneficial to the dealers, in spite of some costs to the manufacturer, with the expectation of long-term returns from better dealer performance. For example, many manufacturers have set up dealer inventory sharing programs that allow dealers to share inventory among themselves. The manufacturers hope that, by promoting inventory sharing, they will be able to provide better service to their end-customers. In the next sub-section we describe a typical dealer inventory sharing system that can be found in practice.
Dealer Inventory Sharing Systems
Although the information systems provided by manufacturers to their dealers usually contain inventory control software, the dealers make their own inventory decisions based on their own demand patterns and financial capabilities, with the tradeoff of maintaining competitive service levels and minimizing inventory costs. Traditional distribution strategies try to achieve a high service level by stocking excess inventory at every point in the distribution network. However, due to the large number of service parts, the low demand rates, and the high cost of service parts in the heavy machine industry, it is generally inefficient and/or impossible for each dealer to stock all parts.
To support the dealers in their inventory management, many manufacturers have begun to promote inventory sharing strategies, encouraging dealers to share their excess inventory with other dealers. Inventory sharing allows the dealers to respond to extraordinary situations, such as emergency orders, by sharing inventory in return for a pre-specified commission. This inventory pooling alleviates the dealers' burden of maintaining safety stocks for a large number of parts and provides access to a wide variety of parts stocked by other dealers.
In a typical inventory sharing program, participating dealers are allowed to adjust the values of the parameters that indicate which parts they want to share and the amount of sharing desired for each part. Typically, dealers can block out some parts from sharing and choose different sharing levels for the parts they choose to put on the inventory sharing system. Most inventory sharing programs do not allow dealers to make profit on a shared part, i.e., the dealers are not allowed to increase the part's price. Any part that is transshipped between dealers is sold at the price that would have been charged if the part had been purchased from the manufacturer. However, in order to encourage sharing among dealers, the manufacturer may give a commission equal to a certain percentage of the part's price to the sharing dealer. The manufacturer absorbs this commission as a goodwill cost to promote inventory sharing.
Dealer inventory sharing systems similar to the one described above have been implemented at a number of companies, including Caterpillar, John Deere, General Motors, etc. Narus and Anderson (1996) provide a number of other examples, from a variety of industries, of systems in which dealer networks share their resources and capabilities.
Managerial Issues
Although dealer inventory sharing systems have existed for many years, there has been little research on the design and implementation of inventory sharing systems in a decentralized dealer network, i.e., a network in which the dealers are independently owned and operated. In particular, issues related to the structure of the optimal inventory control and sharing policies embedded in the inventory system for a decentralized network have not been studied. In this paper, we address the following key managerial issues encountered in decentralized dealer inventory sharing systems:
What are the optimal inventory replenishment and sharing policies for the individual dealers? How does the dealer inventory sharing strategy affect service to the end-customers? What are the right incentives for the manufacturer to offer to the dealers in order to promote dealer inventory sharing?
The research described in this paper is an attempt to answer these questions by developing a framework for modeling and analyzing inventory sharing problems in decentralized dealer networks.
These models will explicitly capture the following key components: the interactions between the individual dealers' decisions in a multi-dealer, decentralized network and the impact of these interrelated decisions on network performance; multiple classes of demand at each dealer, including dealer sharing requests and regular orders; and the role of incentives provided by the manufacturer to the dealers in order to promote dealer inventory sharing.
The first step in our approach is to analyze an individual dealer problem under inventory sharing in a continuous time, make-to-stock framework. We use dynamic programming to characterize the structure of the optimal policy for the individual dealer. A queueing approach is then used to determine the optimal inventory replenishment and sharing policy parameters. We then propose a decentralized, multi-dealer framework to study the impact of inventory sharing. A game theoretic approach is used to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the system.
Literature Review
The research presented in this paper considers three key issues that have been extensively studied in the literature: transshipment and inventory sharing, multiple demand classes and inventory rationing, and decentralized inventory systems. In this section, we briefly review this previous literature and compare our research to this previous work.
Transshipments and Inventory Sharing
Inventory sharing or transshipment refers to the lateral sharing of inventory among depots, dealers or retailers. From the previous research, it is clear that the main advantages of inventory sharing include reduced inventory levels (Evers, 2001 ) and generally higher system service levels (Tagaras, 1989) . The main drawbacks associated with inventory sharing include increased transportation, handling, and administration costs.
One branch of research on inventory transshipment (e.g., Jonsson and Silver, 1987, Diks and Kok, 1996, etc.) focuses on using inventory transshipments as an inventory reallocation method in order to balance inventory requirements after the original allocation or ordering decision has been implemented. Another branch of research on inventory transshipment focuses on the so-called emergency lateral transshipments, i.e., transshipments that only occur when a demand arrives at a location which is stocked out. Thus the transshipment implies that the arriving demand is filled using inventory from another location. In this paper, we consider this type of emergency inventory transshipment.
Numerous researchers have developed analytical models to examine emergency lateral transshipments in periodic review inventory control systems. Examples include Gross (1963) , Krishnan and Rao (1965) , Hoadley and Heyman (1977) , Cohen, et al. (1986) , Tagaras (1989) , and Archibald, et al. (1997) . Much of the literature dealing with continuous review emergency lateral transshipments is concerned with the management of inventory in low-demand, maintenance and/or repairable item systems. Lee (1987) extends the well-known METRIC model of Sherbrooke (1968) to include emergency lateral transshipments. Other examples include Bowman (1986) , Slay (1986 ), Evers (2001 , and Minner, et al. (2001) .
All of these models consider centralized systems in which the dealers are coordinated by a central planner and in which individual dealers do not have the ability to make decisions about whether to share or not. In the research presented in this paper, however, we consider a decentralized system in which the independent dealers have different objectives and make their own decisions about whether to share or not, depending on what is more profitable for them.
Multiple Demand Classes and Inventory Rationing
Another key feature of the problem considered in this paper is the existence of multiple demand classes. Specifically, we model the dealer inventory sharing problem for an individual dealer as a multiple demand class problem in which a dealer's own demand has highest priority and should be filled whenever possible, while the inventory sharing requests from other dealers are treated as a lower-priority class of demand, which may not always be filled. Multiple demand classes have attracted increased attention during the last several years as more industries have been forced to cope with customers having different service requirements. A classic example of service differentiation among multiple demand classes is the yield management problem in the airline industry, in which the inventory of seats is sold under multiple fare classes. Veinott (1965) was one of the first to study a dynamic, single product, non-stationary inventory model with several demand classes in a periodic review framework. Topkis (1968) and Frank, Zhang, and Duenyas (1999) also provide analysis of rationing in a periodic review context. Examples of research on rationing in continuous review systems include Nahmias and Demmy (1981) and Deshpande, et al. (1999) . The problem of inventory rationing in make-to-stock systems has been considered by Ha (1997a,b and 2000) and Vericourt, et al. (2000a,b) .
The research presented in this paper is different from most of the previous rationing literature in that we consider a system in which we have both lost sales and backorders. The higher priority class of demand, i.e., the dealer's own customer demand, is backordered when on-hand inventory is not available. The lower priority class of demand, i.e., the inventory sharing requests from other dealers, are lost when they cannot be immediately satisfied. In addition, most of the previous inventory rationing literature assumes a single location problem where the demand is exogenous.
In contrast, we analyze a multi-dealer problem where one dealer's inventory decisions explicitly impact the demands seen by the other dealers and hence impact the other dealers' decisions and costs.
Decentralized Inventory Systems
The conventional inventory sharing and rationing models discussed above do not fully capture the inventory sharing problem we want to study. This previous research typically assumes that inventory decisions at each location are coordinated by a central agency. Thus all locations share a common objective -to maximize system profits. Therefore, inventory sharing and rationing decisions are made at the system level. In the problem we propose to study, the dealers are independent from the manufacturer and each dealer aims to maximize his own profits. Thus inventory sharing and rationing become decisions in a decentralized system. There has been substantial recent literature on decentralized inventory systems, including Ernst and Cohen (1992) , Cachon (1999) , Cachon (2001) , Cachon and Zipkin (1999) , Lee and Whang (1999) , and Chen, et al. (1997) . All of the above papers focus on contracts or incentive schemes that will coordinate the system, i.e., that will align the objectives of the different parties in the supply chain. Cachon (2001) , which considers a two stage supply chain in which a single supplier serves a set of identical retailers, is the most closely related to our work. In this model, each facility is assumed to use a continuous review (Q, R) inventory policy. Cachon uses the theory of supermodular games (Topkis, 1979) to demonstrate that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and presents a variety of strategies for coordinating the multi-retailer system.
Research on decentralized inventory systems involving transshipments or inventory sharing has been quite scarce. Rudi, et al. (1999) study emergency transshipments in a decentralized newsvendor model. Because this model considers only a single period, any excess inventory is always shared at the end of the period. The problem considered in this paper is more complex than the single period transshipment model consider by Rudi, et al. (1999) . In our continuous time, infinite horizon framework, a dealer may not always share excess inventory but instead may ration his inventory in order to preserve it for his own future needs.
The Dealer Inventory Sharing Problem
In this section, we analyze the dealer inventory sharing problem. We first introduce the two dealer network that we will consider in this paper. We then consider a special case of the inventory sharing problem, which we call the individual dealer problem (IDP), in which each dealer makes his inventory decisions assuming the actions of the other dealer are fixed. Finally, we consider a decentralized, multi-dealer setting to study the impact of inventory sharing among independent dealers. We use a game theoretic approach to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the network.
Problem Description
Consider a dealer network consisting of two independent dealers, i.e., dealers who make their own production/replenishment decisions. Each dealer can be modeled as a production facility that produces a single product to stock. We assume exponential replenishment lead times for each facility and demand which is generated from a Poisson process. Demands arrive one at a time and products are replenished one unit at a time. We assume no set up time and/or cost. Such a system is equivalent to a system in which each dealer is linked to its own production facility with exponential production time. The production facility produces only if the dealer makes a replenishment order. Finished parts are instantly shipped to the dealer and thus are only kept at the dealer. Therefore, a production decision in the system is equivalent to a replenishment decision and we refer to this decision as a production/replenishment decision.
Demand at each dealer comes from two classes of customers with different service priorities. A dealer's own customers are given high-priority. Dealer i's own demand is a Poisson process with arrival rate λ ii , for i = 1, 2. Sharing requests from other dealers are given low-priority. Sharing requests to dealer i from dealer j arrive as a Poisson process with rate λ ij , for i, j = 1, 2, i = j.
When a demand arises, it is either satisfied immediately or not. Demands that are not satisfied immediately are handled as follows:
• When an own customer demand cannot be satisfied immediately by dealer i, with probability α i it can be filled by other dealers through inventory sharing, and with probability (1 − α i ) it is backordered. When a demand is sent to other dealers, dealer i incurs a lost sales cost of h − 1 (representing lost profit). When a demand is backordered, dealer i incurs a one-time backorder cost, π. A backordered demand is also charged a delay cost,π, for each unit of time the demand remains backordered.
• An inventory sharing request (to dealer i) that cannot be satisfied immediately is lost and a lost sales penalty cost of h − 2 (representing lost profit) is incurred at dealer i.
We assume that π > h
, so that it is always better to fill an own customer demand through inventory sharing than to backorder it. Based on our experience with the heavy machine industry, this assumption will generally hold in practice. Notice that h − 1 includes both the lost profit from sending an own customer demand elsewhere, as well as any penalty cost charged by the manufacturer to the requesting dealer. This penalty cost may include, for example, the cost of transporting the part from the sharing dealer to the requesting dealer. Also, notice that h − 2 includes the lost profit from turning down a sharing request. Thus, h − 2 includes any incentive payments offered by the manufacturer to the sharing dealer.
Below, we summarize the notation used throughout this paper: µ = production/replenishment rate for dealer i, for i = 1, 2.
λ ii = arrival rate of own customer demands to dealer i, for i = 1, 2.
λ ij = arrival rate of sharing request demands to dealer i from dealer j, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j. α i = probability that dealer i can find a part through inventory sharing, for i = 1, 2. 
Individual Dealer Problem with Exogenous Factors
In this section, we introduce the individual dealer problem (IDP) with exogenous factors. Specifically, we consider an individual dealer (which we call dealer 1) who has no information regarding the inventory policies used by other dealers, other than his past experience with those dealers. Therefore, the ability and willingness of other dealers to participate in the inventory sharing system is modeled using constant, exogenous factors which may be estimated based on this past experience.
These exogenous factors include the probability that dealer 1's inventory sharing requests will be accepted by other dealers (α 1 ) and the arrival rate of sharing requests from other dealers to dealer 1 (λ 12 ). For this problem, we develop a dynamic programming model to study the structure of the optimal inventory control and inventory sharing policies. Given the structure of the optimal policy, we present a one-dimensional queueing network which we use to determine the optimal inventory control and sharing parameters. Our approach follows that of Ha (1997a) .
Model IDP Formulation
In this section, we develop a dynamic programming formulation for the IDP with exogenous factors.
Let I(t) denote the inventory level at dealer 1 at time t. Letĥ(I(t)
+ ) be the inventory holding cost function andπ(I(t) − ) be the delay cost function due to backordering 1 .
The set of decision epochs in this model includes the set of all arrival epochs and all service completion epochs. There are two decisions that must be made. One is the production/replenishment decision of whether to continue or stop production. This decision must be made at every decision epoch, i.e., any time a product is produced and sent into inventory or anytime a customer of either type arrives. The other decision is the demand-filling decision of whether or not to immediately satisfy a demand. This decision must be made at every arrival epoch, i.e., every time a demand of either types arrives.
A control policy specifies decisions at any time given the state of the system. Due to the exponential demand interarrival and production times, the system possesses the memoryless property.
Therefore, the optimal actions depend only on the current state of the system. In other words, a
Markov policy is optimal. The optimal control policy u = {u(t), t ≥ 0} minimizes the following expected discounted system cost over an infinite horizon:
where I u (t) is the dealer's inventory level at time t, under control policy u, N u 1,B (t) is the number of own customer demands that are backordered up through time t, under control policy u, N u 1,L (t) is the number of own customer demands that are filled by other dealers through inventory sharing up through time t, under control policy u, and N u 2,L (t) is the number of sharing requests that are not satisfied by this dealer, i.e., are lost, up through time t, under control policy u. This cost function gives the total expected discounted cost, given an initial inventory level, x, and a control policy u.
Let f (x) be the optimal system cost given the initial inventory x, over all the policies u.
For any Markov policy, u, the inventory process I u (t) is a continuous time Markov chain. After uniformization by the uniform rate φ 1 = µ + λ 11 + λ 12 , the continuous time semi-Markov process is transformed into the equivalent discrete time Markov process and the optimality equation for this process can be expressed as follows. Here we assume, without loss of generality, that δ + φ 1 = 1.
where h(x) is the holding and delay cost per unit time, i.e.,
and H i , i = 1, 2, are the operators defined by
In the optimality equation, the first item is the inventory holding cost and the backorder delay cost. The second item represents the production decision. If having one more unit leads to lower cost, i.e., if f (x + 1) < f(x), then we should produce, otherwise, we should stop production. The third and fourth terms deal with the decisions of whether or not to fill an own customer demand and a sharing request demand, respectively. Since there is a positive backorder cost, it is optimal to always fill an own customer demand when there is on-hand inventory. If there is no on-hand inventory available, the demand is either backordered (with probability 1 − α 1 ) or lost to another facility (with probability α 1 ). Here we assume that it is always better to fill an own customer demand using inventory from another facility than to backorder it, i.e., we assume π > h − 1 . For a sharing request demand, we fill the demand only if the penalty cost for not filling it is greater than the cost increase from having one less unit of inventory due to filling the demand, i.e., only if
When there is no on-hand inventory, a sharing request demand is lost.
Structure of the Optimal Policy
In this section, we use the dynamic programming formulation presented in the previous section to demonstrate that a stationary base-stock and rationing policy is optimal for Model IDP.
Let ϑ be the set of functions, defined on all integers, that are convex and have their first difference bounded from below by −h − 1 when x > 0. Thus, for each υ ∈ ϑ, the following conditions are satisfied:
According to the assumptions of this model, it is not optimal to backorder or lose sales to a dealer when the on-hand inventory level is positive, i.e., when x > 0. This assumption, and the assumption that π > h − 1 , leads to (4). Define the operator T on the set of real-valued functions, υ, as follows:
where H 1 and H 2 are as defined in the previous section. The following lemma shows that the operator T preserves the structure of functions in ϑ.
Lemma 1 If υ ∈ ϑ and h(x) is convex and non-decreasing when
The following theorem, which specifies the form of the optimal inventory control and sharing policy, follows directly from Lemma 1. In this theorem, part (a) indicates that f (x) − f (x + 1), the marginal benefit of having one additional unit of inventory, is decreasing. In addition, this marginal benefit is always less than h − 1 when x > 0. This is due to our assumption that a demand from the dealer's own customers is not backordered or sent elsewhere unless there is no on-hand inventory. The convexity of the cost function implies that the marginal benefit of having one more unit on-hand decreases as the on-hand inventory increases. At some point (S 1 ), the marginal benefit of having one more unit onhand switches from positive to negative. This is the point at which production should be stopped.
Theorem 1 (a) The optimal cost function, f (x), is convex and its first difference is bounded from below by
Moreover, the different service priorities imply that the penalty cost of not satisfying a customer is different for each class. Thus, rationing is used to save stock to fill future, higher priority class demands. The critical rationing level (K 1 ) is the point at which the marginal benefit of satisfying a sharing request just exceeds the marginal cost of losing this demand, i.e., υ(
We call this production/replenishment and inventory sharing policy an (S 1 , K 1 ) policy.
Queueing Network of an (S,K) Policy for Model IDP
In the previous section we demonstrated that a stationary base-stock policy with a rationing level, i.e., an (S 1 , K 1 ) policy, is optimal for the make-to-stock inventory sharing system. In this section, we demonstrate how to compute the optimal parameters (S 1 , K 1 ) given this knowledge of the structure of the optimal policy. With the Markovian properties of the problem, we can use an M/M/1/S 1 queue with state-dependent service rates to model the system. Specifically, in the queueing model, a production/replenishment increases the inventory level (the state variable) by one unit at a time, thus representing a "customer arrival" in a traditional queueing model. Demand of either class represents a "customer departure" in a traditional queueing model since these demands, if filled immediately, reduce the system inventory level one unit at a time. Here S 1 is the buffer size of the queue and ensures that inventory level never exceeds S 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the queueing network for the individual dealer inventory sharing model. As shown in the figure, sharing requests are satisfied only if the inventory level is above K 1 . Inventory sharing requests are lost when the inventory level is at or below K 1 . In other words, the service rate is λ 11 + λ 12 when I(t) > K 1 , and λ 11 when 0 < I(t) ≤ K 1 . When the inventory level is at or below 0, with probability α 1 , the dealer can obtain the part from some other dealer through inventory sharing. In this case the inventory level at this dealer is not changed by a demand. Otherwise, the dealer will backorder the demand and the inventory level will decrease by one unit. Below, we summarize some additional notation that will be used in the remainder of this paper:
= effective own demand utilization for dealer i, for i = 1, 2.
= total demand utilization for dealer i, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j. S i = base stock level for dealer i, for i = 1, 2.
K i = rationing level for dealer i, for i = 1, 2.
p ik = steady state probability that dealer i has inventory level k, for i = 1, 2 and k = −∞, . . . , S i .
Let p 1k denote the steady-state probability that the inventory level at dealer 1 is k, for k ≤ S 1 .
These probabilities depend on S 1 and K 1 and can be calculated from the global balance equations.
The steady-state probabilities for this system are:
where
We assume ρ 1α < 1 in order for the system to have a steady state.
Given these steady-state probabilities, we can define the following performance measures for the inventory sharing system. Detailed calculations for these performance measures are shown in Appendix C.
1. EI 1 (S 1 , K 1 ): Expected on-hand inventory at dealer 1 as a function of S 1 and K 1 .
Expected number of backorders at dealer 1 as a function of S 1 and K 1 .
3. P 10 (S 1 , K 1 ): Probability that the inventory level at dealer 1 is less than or equal to 0.
4. P 1K 1 (S 1 , K 1 ): Probability that the inventory level at dealer 1 is less than or equal to K 1 .
Finally, the dealer's expected cost can be expressed as the function of the performance measures defined above:
The total cost is comprised of the expected holding cost (the first term), two costs related to backorders (the expected delay cost and the one time backorder cost for each backordered demand), and two types of lost sales penalty cost for not filling potential demands (the last two terms of the cost function).
While it is difficult to prove anything about the structure of this long run average cost function, it is relatively straight-forward to develop a search algorithm, similar to that presented in Ha (1997a) , to find the values of (S 1 , K 1 ) that minimize this cost function. For details and a complete numerical study for model IDP, see Zhao (2001) .
Inventory Sharing in Decentralized Dealer Networks
In this section, we consider a decentralized multi-dealer setting to study the impact of inventory sharing and the interaction between the individual dealers' inventory decisions. A game theoretic approach is used to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the dealers under inventory sharing. In the previous section, we considered the inventory stocking and rationing problem for an individual dealer. It was assumed that the probability of a sharing request being satisfied by other dealers (α i ) and the arrival rate of inventory sharing requests from other dealers (λ ij ) were exogenous factors and independent of the dealer's own inventory decisions. However, a given dealer's inventory stocking decisions clearly have an impact on the other dealer's cost (through inventory sharing) and vice versa. Thus, the goal of this section is to make the sharing decisions (and hence the sharing probability, α i , and the arrival rate of sharing requests, λ ij ) endogenous to the model. In addition,
we would like to characterize the equilibrium dealer inventory stocking and rationing decisions and to examine the impact of incentives and penalties provided by the manufacturer on these decisions.
In the previous sections we have shown that a stationary base-stock policy with a rationing level, i.e., an (S, K) policy, is optimal for the make-to-stock system considered in this paper. In this section, we consider the interaction between the dealers' inventory decisions under the assumption that each dealer uses an (S, K) policy.
Equilibrium State Performance Measures under Inventory Sharing
In the decentralized model with inventory sharing, the state probabilities of a given dealer are functions of the dealer's own stocking and rationing decisions, as well as the other dealer's stocking and rationing decisions. For example, the probability that dealer i is stocked out, P i0 , for i = 1, 2, depends on both (S 1 , K 1 ) and (S 2 , K 2 ). In this section, we first show that there exists equilibrium steady state probabilities for each dealer, conditional on the stocking and rationing decisions of the two dealers, (S 1 , K 1 ) and (S 2 , K 2 ). The first step is to determine dealer 1's steady state probabilities, taking dealer 2's steady state probabilities as fixed. Then, we consider dealer 2's steady state probabilities conditional on dealer 1's expectations about these steady state probabilities. We show that this approach leads to an equilibrium solution for the two dealers' expectations about the steady state probabilities, conditional on their stocking decisions, (S 1 , K 1 ) and (S 2 , K 2 ).
The probabilities P i0 and α i , for i = 1, 2, can be written as functions of (S 1 , K 1 ) and (S 2 , K 2 ), as follows:
The probability that dealer i's inventory level is less than or equal to 0, i = 1, 2.
The probability that dealer i's inventory level is less than or equal to
Simplifying, we have:
In all of the above, to simplify the problem, we assume γ 1 = 1, ρ 1 = 1, γ 2 = 1, ρ 2 = 1.
Finally, notice that we can write:
Given the stocking and rationing decisions of each dealer, {S 1 ,K 1 ,S 2 ,K 2 }, we can obtain the probabilities {α 1 , α 2 , P 10 , P 20 } by jointly solving (5), (6), (9) and (10). The following proposition establishes the existence of a solution to the steady state probabilities under decentralized decision making. Given the steady-state probabilities, we can define the following performance measures for the system.
Proposition 1 For a given set of inventory stocking and rationing decisions for the two deal-
ers, {S 1 ,K 1 ,S 2 ,K 2 },
EI
Dealer i's expected on hand inventory as a function of the parameters
and K 2 , i = 1, 2.
Characterization of Equilibrium Solution
In this sub-section, we focus on characterizing the equilibrium solution to the two dealer inventory sharing and rationing problem. Given the steady-state probabilities for the dealer's inventory level, the dealer's expected cost can be expressed as a function of the performance measures defined above:
The total cost is comprised of the expected holding cost (the first term), two costs related to backorders (the one time backorder cost for each backordered demand and the expected delay cost), and two types of lost sales penalty cost for not filling potential demands (the last two terms of the cost function). Rearranging (13), we have:
The above formulation suggests a way to solve for the equilibrium strategies of the two dealers.
Start with a fixed strategy, (S 2 , K 2 ), for dealer 2 and compute the best response, (S 1 , K 1 ), for dealer 1 based on the above cost function. Then compute dealer 2's best strategy, (S 2 , K 2 ), anticipating dealer 1's best response. If this procedure converges to a solution, then it is an equilibrium solution for the two dealer problem. For our complex model, we were not able to show that an equilibrium exists for all sets of problem parameters. In fact, we were able to find counter examples, i.e., parameter values for which an equilibrium solution does not exist. In the next section we focus on a numerical analysis of the equilibrium solution to the two dealer problem.
Numerical Study and Managerial Insights
In this section, we present the results of a numerical study of inventory sharing under decentralized decision making. Specifically, we investigate the sensitivity of the equilibrium system cost and the equilibrium decisions to the model parameters. The goal of this study is to gain insights into the equilibrium solution under decentralized decision making and to compare this solution to two benchmark policies: a no sharing inventory rationing policy and a full-sharing inventory policy.
Notice that if we set K equal to 0 or S, we get these two extreme policies. The first is an (S,0) policy, or a complete sharing policy, in which the dealers do not differentiate between their own demand and sharing requests from other dealers. The other is an (S,S) policy, or a no-sharing policy, in which neither dealer accepts any sharing requests. By setting K equal to 0 or S in (14), we can calculate the expected costs of these two alternative policies.
We conducted the numerical study by varying the system parameters related to the arrival and departure rates (λ 1 , λ 2 , µ, etc.) and the cost parameters (π,π,ĥ, h − 1 , and h − 2 ). We scaled the above cost parameters by π in order to reduce the number of parameters. See Zhao (2001) for a detailed description of the numerical study.
In this numerical study, we focus on the parameters that may influence dealers' willingness to share. Some of these parameters, such as h − 1 and h − 2 , may be used by the manufacturer to change the dealers' sharing characteristics. Other parameters are related to the dealers' market conditions, such as the dealers' parts utilization (ρ 1 or ρ 2 ) and the customer arrival rate (λ 11 or λ 22 ). increases, the base stock levels, S i , i = 1, 2, stays the same for both dealers, but the rationing levels, K i , i = 1, 2, decrease gradually. This is due to the fact that the penalty for declining a sharing request contributes only a small fraction of each dealer's cost and therefore does not lead to an increase in the base stock level. However, as h − 2 increases, the incentives for both dealers to share inventory increases. As a result, each dealer lowers its rationing level as h − 2 increases. The figure also indicates that the base stock levels under the full-sharing and no-sharing policies are not affected by h − 2 . Figure 5 demonstrates the impact of h − 2 (the sharing incentive) on system cost under the three sharing schemes: decentralized (S, K), full-sharing (S, 0), and no-sharing (S, S). It is shown in the figure that the system costs under the full-sharing and no-sharing policies increase as h − 2 increases. This is due to the fact that the increase of h − 2 leads to more penalty cost for not filling sharing requests. For the decentralized system (S, K), however, as h − 2 increases, the system cost decreases first and then increases. When h − 2 is relatively small, the increase of h − 2 leads to a decrease in the rationing levels for the dealers, which results in more sharing between the dealers. When h − 2 becomes large enough, however, the rationing level for each dealer is reduced to 0, and the probability that a dealer can get a part from some other dealer can no longer increase. Hence the increase of h − 2 will then increase the system cost. Notice that when no incentive for sharing is given on the individual dealer costs. This figure shows that the dealer with the larger fraction of total demand also incurs a larger share of the cost in a decentralized setting. This is due to the fact that the larger volume dealer must carry higher levels of inventory, even in the presence of inventory sharing, and hence incurs a larger share of the system cost. Figure 7 demonstrates the impact of the system utilization on the total system cost under the three sharing policies. It is shown that as the system utilization (ρ = ρ 11 + ρ 22 ) increases, the total system cost increases for all three sharing policies. However, as the system utilization increases, the system cost under the no-sharing policy increases rapidly while the system cost in the decentralized setting or the full-sharing policy increases gradually. A more interesting observation is that the decentralized policy has a large benefit over the no-sharing policy for high-levels of utilization. Also, even at high levels of utilization, the decentralized setting achieves a system cost which is close to the cost of the full-sharing policy. This figure shows that significant backorders may exist in the system if the dealers do not share inventory. However, as incentives are provided to the dealers to share inventory, the system backorders rapidly decline and approach the level of backorders under a full-inventory sharing policy.
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered an inventory sharing and rationing problem in a decentralized dealer network. We first analyzed an individual dealer problem under inventory sharing in a make-to-stock setting. We used dynamic programming to characterize the structure of the optimal policy for an individual dealer. A queueing approach was then used to characterize the performance measures for this optimal inventory replenishment and sharing policy. We then considered a decentralized multi-dealer setting to study the impact of inventory sharing among independent dealers. A game theoretic approach was used to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the decentralized system.
The three key features of our model are as follows. First, we considered a dealer network where dealers have the flexibility to share inventory to satisfy customer demand. Second, we considered multiple classes of demand for a given dealer, where a dealer's own demand has higher priority than other dealers' sharing requests. Finally, we considered the interaction of the dealers in a decentralized setting, where dealers can set their inventory levels and sharing levels based on their own cost structure and in anticipation of other dealer's stocking and sharing policies. Hence the demand for sharing requests (the low-priority demand) is endogenous in our model, rather than being specified as an exogenous factor.
The key findings of our model are as follows:
1. Incentives for the sharing of inventory can have a big impact on the level of inventory sharing by the independent dealers. 2. As the incentive for inventory sharing increases, the dealers respond by decreasing their rationing levels, rather than increasing their base stock levels.
3. A small level of incentive for inventory sharing may be sufficient to achieve the benefits of a full-inventory sharing policy.
4. The benefit of inventory sharing increases as the system utilization increases. 
Convexity.
We need to show that
for all x. In other words, we need to show that
Since each of the three minimums in (15) can take two possible values, there are eight cases to consider. However, four of these cases are infeasible, i.e., violate condition (3) or (4). We present the four feasible cases below. The remaining four cases are easily shown to be infeasible.
. Then, by (3), (15) becomes:
becomes:
Boundedness. 
There are four cases to consider. However, one of these cases is infeasible, i.e., violates condition (3) or (4). We present the three feasible cases below. Therefore, m 0 (x) satisfies both the convexity and boundness conditions and m 0 (x) ∈ ϑ for any x.
Convexity.
For x ≤ 0, we have: Finally, we want to show T υ ∈ ϑ, i.e., T υ(x) also satisfies the convexity and boundness con- 
since µ + 2 i=1 λ 1i = 1 − δ ≤ 1. This concludes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Part (a) follows directly Lemma 1. For parts (b) and (c), we follow Ha (1997a) for the proof.
Define:
Since υ ∈ ϑ, υ(x + 1) − υ(x) is increasing. Recall that h 
C System Performance Measures for Model IDP-LS
Given the steady state probabilities, we define the following performance measures for the system: 
